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Conclusiveness of United States Oil Shale
Placer Mining Claim Patents
By GEORGE E. LOHR*
A significant amount of land in western Colorado containing
deposits of oil shale is privately owned.' Title to much of this land
is derived under United States patents based on oil shale placer
mining claims. The recent intensification of efforts to develop an
oil shale industry has given new importance to the question whether
these patents are vulnerable to attack by the United States or by
others. Most of the authorities bearing on this question have long
been part of the public land law and apply to Federal public land
patents of all kinds, but a new facet relating specifically to oil shale
patents has been added by the April 17, 1964, decision of the Solici2
tor of the Department of the Interior in Union Oil Co. of California.
This article represents an attempt to distill from the cases some
conclusions concerning the present status of the law governing the
conclusive effect of oil shale placer mining claim patents. Based
upon these conclusions, some suggestions will be made concerning
the scope of examinations of title to privately owned property, title
to which is derived under such patents.
EFFECT OF A UNITED STATES PATENT, IN GENERAL

The issuance of a United States patent passes to the patentee
legal title to the property therein described? It divests the Department of the Interior of further jurisdiction over that property, with
the result that a patent cannot be cancelled by administrative action.4
Any challenge to the validity of a patent must be made in a judicial
proceeding, taken in the name of the government for that special
purpose.5
*Member, Colorado and Denver Bar Associations. Partner, Davis, Graham and Stubbs,
Denver, Colo. B.S., South Dakota State College of A&M Arts, 1953; J.D., University
of Michigan, 1958.
'Approximately 335,000 acres, according to HANNA, Oil Shale 12 (1964), a reprint
of articles appearing in The Denve" Post, Aug. 30, 1964, through Sept. 6, 1964.
This estimate is stated to be based on a rough estimate by the staff of Lowell M.
Puckett, then Director of the Colorado Land Office of the United States Bureau of
Land Management.
271 Interior Dec. 169 (1964).
3
E.g., Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 106 U.S. 447 (1882). Provided, of
course, that the Department of the Interior had jurisdiction over the disposition of
the lands. See, e.g., ibid.
4
E.g., ibid; Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U.S. 379 (1897).
5 Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 106 U.S. 447 (1882); see United States v.
Stone. 69 U.S. 525 (1865). An exception exists in the case of void patents. See
discussion at footnote 45 et. seq. infra, Attacks by the United States, Relief for Lack
of Jurisdiction to Issue Patent.
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The issuance of a United States patent necessarily involves
consideration of the qualifications of the applicant, the acts he has
performed to secure title, the nature of the land, and whether it is
of a class which is open to sale.6 The issuance of a patent by the
Department of the Interior is a judgment of a special tribunal upon
such matters.7 It also is an adjudication of compliance with relevant
state statutes relating to perfection of mining claims.8 Issuance of
a United States patent creates a presumpion that all preceding steps
required by law were duly taken.'
ATTACKS BY THE UNITED STATES

I. Grounds for Relief:
The United States may attack a United States patent on any
one of three grounds:10 (1) fraud by the patentee in inducing issuance of the patent;' (2) mistake by the Department of the Interior
in issuing the patent; 2 and (3) lack of jurisdiction in the Department of the Interior to issue the patent. 3
The United States cannot avoid its patent for irregularities or
defects of procedure. 4
The Attorney General of the United States has the authority
to bring actions in the name of and on behalf of the United States
to cancel United States patents."
A. Relief for Fraud
A patent obtained by fraud is not void, but is voidable upon
6 Steel v. St. Louis Smelting& Ref. Co., 106 U.S. 447 (1882).
7 Ibid; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1882); see El Paso
Brick Co. v. McKnight, 233 U.S. 250 (1914).
8Creede & Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v. Uinta Tunnel Mining & Transportation Co., 196 U.S. 337 (1905).
9 Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914) (presumption
rebutted); St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1882) (presumption conclusive against collateral attack).
10 The three categories adopted provide a convenient grouping for the purpose of discussion of remedies available to the United States. Most, if not all, cases of attacks
by the United States on its land patents are based on grounds which are described
accurately by one of these categories.
11
Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 '(1914) ; United States v.
Minor, 114 U.S. 233 (1885).
2
1 Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U.S. 379 (1897)
(patent approved by clerk
in ignorance of pending proceedings based on conflicting claims) ; see Williams v.
United States, 138 U.S. 514 (1891) (inadvertent certification when administrative
decision on conflicting claim was pending).
1
' United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525 (1865) (land within the limits of a military
reservation created by executive order).
4See Wight v. Dubois, 21 Fed. 693 (D. Colo. 1884). As examples of procedural
defects the court suggested the time of publication of notice, the filing of the plat,
and the discovery of mineral in the discovery shaft.
IsUnited States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888) ; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co.,
125 U.S. 273 (1888).
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suit by the United States."6 The United States has the same right
to avoid a patent issued on the basis of fraudulent inducements as
does an individual grantor to avoid a deed for such cause.17
The history of disposition of public lands by the United States
is replete with cases in which the United States has sought judicial
relief to avoid patents obtained by fraud. In some of these cases
lands were alleged to have been acquired by -dumiy" entrymen for
the benefit of persons not qualified by law to acquire such lands. 8
In others, false representations were allegedly made concerning satisfaction of requirements of the homestead laws, including settlement
and construction of improvements,19 and concerning the amount of
other land owned by the applicant."0 Still other cases involve charges
of false representations that land was not known mineral land
within the meaning of laws excluding such land from disposition
thereunder.2 This list is by no means exhaustive.
In an action by the United States to cancel a United States
patent allegedly issued as a result of fraud, the United States has
the burden of proving the fraud.22 To carry this burden, the evidence
must command respect and produce conviction' - that is, it must
be clear, convincing, and unambiguous.
If property has been transferred to a third person by a patentee
who obtained his patent by fraud, the United States can recover
from the third person the property so patented,' provided that the
third person is not a bona fide purchaser.2 "
16

Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914).
United States v. Minor, 114 U.S. 233 '(1885); see United States v. San Jacinto Tin
Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888). United States v. Minor, supra, contains the suggestion
that the right of the United States to avoid a patent may be greater than that of the
individual grantor, at least where the United States must rely on proofs furnished by
the entryman because of the impracticability of independently checking the facts.
1 Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918); Diamond Coal & Coke Co.
v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914) ; United States v. Bighorn Sheep Co., 9 F.2d
192 (D. Wyo. 1925); United States v. Booth-Kelly Lumber Co., 246 Fed. 970
(D. Ore. 1917).
'9 Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U.S. 307 (1887); United States v.
Minor, 114 U.S. 233 (1885); United States v. Jones, 242 Fed. 609 (9th Cir. 1917);
United States v. Norris, 222 Fed. 14 (8th Cir. 1915); United States v. Albright,
234 Fed. 202 (D. Mont. 1916) ; United States v. Cooper, 217 Fed. 846 (D. Mont.
1914) (construction of improvements only).
20 United States v. Christopher, 71 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1934).
21
Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914); United States
v. Southern Pac. R.R., 11 F.2d 546 (S.D. Cal. 1926).
22 Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914); Colorado Coal &
Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U.S. 307 (1887).
3 Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914); United States
v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888) ; Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United
States, 123 U.S. 307 (1887); United States v. Mnixwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S.
J25 (1887).
24
See Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U.S. 307 (1887).
17

2 Ibid.
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The United States may elect to affirm a patent obtained by
fraud and to recover damages for the fraud from the patenteeu
or from a subsequent owner of the property who is not a bona fide
purchaser." It is implicit in these decisions that the administrative
officials have the authority to decide to elect the damage remedy,
although the effect is to permit disposition of public lands in a
manner not authorized specifically by Congress.- Transfer of the
property by the patentee does not extinguish the right of the United
States to recover from him damages resulting from the fraud. 8
Under some circumstances, an action by the United States to
cancel a patent based on fraud may result in an election of remedies
by the United States, either confirming the patent or electing to
rescind it."
It would seem that the measure of damages for fraud should
be the difference between the value of the lands patented, measured
as of the time of patent, and the amount paid by the patentee to the
United States, and there is authority to this effect." Measure of
damages in these fraud cases has not received extensive consideration by the courts, however, and no completely consistent rule is
established by the cases. In absence of other evidence of value, a
purchaser from the patentee has been held liable for the amount
for which such purchaser had agreed to sell the land, plus interest
(in lieu of rents and profits), for the time such purchaser had
possession."1 If the patentee has improved the lands subsequent to
patent and prior to sale to a third party, the value of the improvements must be deducted from the sale price if that price is to be
used as a guide to establish the value of the land for the purpose
of measuring damages.' In absence of proof of value of the lands,
the government has been limited to the minimum government
price of the lands.33
2 'United States v. Whited & Wheless, 246 U.S. 552 (1917); United States v. Jones,
242 Fed. 609 (9th Cir. 1917); Bistline v. United States, 229 Fed. 546 (9th Cir.
1916); United States v. Koleno, 226 Fed. 180 (8th Cir. 1915).
27
Pitan v. United States, 241 Fed. 364 (8th Cir. 1917).
28Bistline v. United States, 229 Fed. 546 (9th Cir. 1916); United States v. Koleno,
226 Fed. 180 (8th Cir. 1915).
2 United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922); ci. Bistline v. United
States, 229 Fed. 546 (9th Cir. 1916) ; United States v. Bellingham Bay Improvement
Co., 6 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1925). No full treatment of the election of remedies doctrine as applied to voidable patents is attempted here.
30 Pitan v. United States, 241 Fed. 364 (8th Cir. 1917) (not considering specifically the
time as of which the land should be valued) ; see United States v. Norris, 222 Fed.
14 (8th Cir. 1915).
31 United States v. Cooper, 217 Fed. 846 (D. Mont. 1914). No mention was made
of deduction of the amount received by the United States for the land. The court
created a lien on the patented lands to secure to the United States the payment of
the damages.
32 United States v. Norris, 222 Fed. 14 (8th Cir. 1915).
33 Ibid. But had not the government already received this amount upon entry?
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B. Relief for Mistake
A patent issued by mistake is not void but is voidable upon suit
by the United States. 4
Some of the instances of mistake considered in the cases are
issuance of an agricultural land patent based upon erroneous diagrams furnished by the surveyor general which failed to show a
conflict with a prior mining claim as to which a patent application
proceeding had been commenced;5 issuance of a patent at a time
when there was in effect an order of the Land Department suspending action on the entry pending resolution of disputes concerning
conflicting claims;36 and issuance of a patent at a time when a decision of the register and receiver rejecting the claim was on appeal
to the Commissioner of the General Land Office."T
Issuance of a patent to lands reserved from disposition for
public purposes or previously disposed of, based upon a mistake
of fact or law, might be considered as a form of mistake,38 but in
view of the difference in applicable rules of law obtaining in such
cases, these and similar types of "mistake" are considered separately
under the category of lack of jurisdiction.
In an action to cancel a United States patent based on mistake,
the United States should have the burden of proving the mistake
upon which its claim for relief is based. The patentee cannot defend
successfully on the basis that, notwithstanding the mistake, the facts
presented to, but not yet passed on by, the Department of Interior
entitle him to a patent.39 These matters must be considered by the
Department of the Interior, the tribunal entrusted by the law with
jurisdiction over such matters."
The United States can recover lands patented by mistake from
a third person to whom they have been conveyed by the patentee,
provided that person is not a bona fide purchaser.41
34 Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U.S. 379 (1897).

See Empire Star Mines Co. v. Grass Valley Bullion Mines, 99 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.
1938). No proceedings to cancel the agricultural land patent were ever instituted,
although the United States had invitked the mining claim owner to request institution
of such proceedings.
36 Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U.S. 379 (1897). The "Land Department"
is sometimes referred to in this article. Its functions are among those now performed
by the Department of the Interior.
3 United States v. Southern Pac. R.R., 43 F.2d 591 (S.D. Cal. 1930), afld, 51 F.2d
873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
38
See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 (1908).
3 Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U.S. 379 (1897); see Southern Pac. R.R.
v. United States, 51 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
40
Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U.S. 379 (1897); Southern Pac. R.R. v.
United States, 51 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
41 Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U.S. 379 (1897).
35
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The United States may elect to affirm a patent issued by mistake
and to recover from the patentee the value of the land so patented,"2
at least where the land was conveyed to a bona fide purchaser prior
to discovery of the mistake.' If this election may be made in all
cases by the administrative officials in their discretion, the effect
of election of the compensation remedy will be to permit disposition
of public lands in a manner not authorized specifically by Congress.
The amount which the United States may recover in case of
election of the compensation remedy probably is measured by the
value of the land patented at the date of patent," perhaps less the
amount paid by the patentee on entry, but no cases have been discovered in which the measure of damages has received detailed
consideration.
C. Relief for Lack of Jurisdiction to Issue Patent
A patent issued by the Department of the Interior when that
Department has no jurisdiction over the lands patented is void.
Lack of jurisdiction cases include situations where the land
has been reserved from disposition as a result of Presidential order,'
or treaty reservation. 7 They also include situations where the land
is not public property, no provision has been made by Congress
for its sale, or it has been previously disposed of or has been reserved
from sale by Congress." These patents pass no title and may be
attacked directly 9 or collaterally."s
Legal actions to obtain adjudications that patents are void
are appropriate " and are not uncommon. Often the facts establishing that a patent is void are not apparent from the face of the
patent, " and even when a patent is void on its face it may be desirable to obtain a judicial decree confirming that fact.
Appropriate cases for collateral attack on void patents would
seem to be limited to circumstances where private rights could be
obtained in the land. Otherwise a claimant would have no interest
on the basis of which to maintain an action. Such appropriate cases
42Southern
43

Pac. R.R. v. United States, 200 U.S. 341 (1906).

Ibid.

44 See ibid.
45See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 (1908).
46Stone v. United States, 69 U.S. 525 (1865) ; see Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S.
70 (1908) (grant by approved list rather than by patent).
47United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 227 U.S. 355 (1913).
48 See St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S, 636 (1882).
9
4 Stone v. United States, 69 U.S. 525 (1865).
50
see St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1882).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926).
52 See ibid.
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might include situations where land has been patented twice or
where a withdrawal in effect at the time of inception of rights on
the basis of which a patent issued was subsequently cancelled.
It has been held that the United States can elect to leave void
patents uncancelled and sue the patentee for the value of the lands
sold by it,53 although this is conceptually inconsistent with the
doctrine that void patents pass no title.
If the United States is barred from attacking a void patent by
reason of a statute of limitations, as discussed herein, any person
claiming through the United States based upon rights initiated subsequent to the patent is barred as well.'
II. Defenses to Attacks by the United States:
The defenses of bona fide purchase and statute of limitations
have been asserted frequently in actions in which the United States
has attacked patents.
A. Bona Fide Purchase
Bona fide purchase is a defense to an action by the United
States to recover lands from a purchaser from a patentee, where
such action is based on fraud in inducing issuance of the patent 5
or on mistake." Presumably it is no defense where the action is
based on an assertion that the patent is void because of lack of
jurisdiction of the Land Department to issue the patent, the patent
in such case being void rather than voidable. No case has been
discovered where that defense has been asserted in such a situation.
The elements of bona fide purchase are valuable consideration,
absence of notice, and presence of good faith." A transferee who
paid no consideration cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser."
A purchaser is not required to inquire behind the patent into the
circumstances surrounding its issuance, and is not deemed to have
constructive notice of such matters." The good faith of a purchaser
from the patentee is not impaired by information contained in the
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926). The value was held to be the
amount the United States would haie received for the lands for the benefit of
Chippewa Indians under the act by which the Chippewas ceded the lands to the
United States.
54 Hogan v. United States, 72 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 752
(1935).
55 See Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U.S. 307 (1887).
5
0See Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U.S. 379 (1897); United States v.
Winona & St. P. R.R., 165 U.S. 463 (1897); United States v. Krause, 92 F. Supp.
756 (W.D. La. 1950).
57United States v. Winona & St. P. R.R., 165 U.S. 463 (1897); United States v.
California & Ore. Land Co., 148 U.S. 31 (1893).
53 United States v. Cooper, 217 Fed. 846'(D. Mont. 1914)..
5
9See United States v. California & Ore. Land Co., 148 U.S. 31 (1893).
5S3United
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patent application file, where the purchaser had no actual knowledge
of such information."0 Anyone purchasing land actually occupied
by settlers claiming rights under the homestead laws is charged with
notice of the settlers' claims."1 Close association with an entryman
under the homestead laws, visible conditions on homesteaded lands,
and proximity of purchaser's ranches, business, and residence to the
homesteaded lands are sufficient to place a purchaser on notice that
the entryman did not meet the requirements of actual residence and
construction of improvements, as required by the homestead laws."
Under familiar legal principles, a principal is charged with knowledge acquired by his agent who was empowered to purchase property
on behalf of the principal.'
Knowledge that the opinion of officials of the government has
changed concerning a question of law on which turned the validity
of previously issued patents is not sufficient to take away the protection of good faith.6 ' A transfer of ownership of a majority of stock
of a corporation to persons having no knowledge of fraudulent
acquisition of a patent by a person who acted for, and transferred
the property to, the corporation does not enable the corporation to
contend successfully that it is a bona fide purchaser. 5 If a mortgagee of a patentee can establish that it is a bona fide purchaser,
its interest will be protected in an action by the United States to
cancel a patent based on fraud of the patentee." The burden of
proving bona fide purchase is on the one asserting that defense. 7
B. Statute of Limitations
In 1891 there was enacted the following statute of limitations
of general applicability to patents for public lands of the United
States, including patents issued for placer mining claims:
Suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent shall
only be brought within six years after the date of the issuance of
such patents.6'0
When early considered by the courts, this statute was read
literally and broadly to bar any action by the United States after the
United States v. Krause, 92 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. La. 1950).
61 United States v. New Orleans Pac. Ry., 248 U.S. 507 (1919).
82
United States v. Cooper, 217 Fed. 846 (D. Mont. 1914).
e3United States v. Smith, 181 Fed. 545 (D. Ore. 1910), affd sub nom. Linn & Lane
Timber Co. v. United States, 196 Fed. 593 (9th Cir. 1912), modified on other
grounds, 203 Fed. 394 (9th Cir. 1913), aff d, 236 U.S. 574 (1915).
"United States v. Southern Pac. R.R., 184 U.S. 49 (1902). All past decisions of
60

courts justified the view that the patents were valid; bona fide purchase was expressly
provided by statute as a defense.
5 United States v. Booth-Kelly Lumber Co., 246 Fed. 970 (D. Ore. 1917).
8
6 United States v. Grover, 227 Fed. 181 (N.D. Cal. 1915).
"7United States v. Cooper, 217 Fed. 846 (D. Mont. 1914).
6826
Stat. 1093 (1891), 43 U.S.C. § 1166 (1964).
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statutory period had run, regardless of any mistake or error of the
Land Department or any fraud or misrepresentations of the patentee,
provided only that the land was public land of the United States
and open to sale and conveyance through the Land Department."8
The landmark case of United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater
Power Co.69 established that the statute bars an action by the United
States even if the patent was void at its inception because it purported
to convey land reserved for public purposes. The reasoning would
apply equally to validate patents void for any reason where the
United States owned the land at the time the patent issued.
At an early date, however, it was held that the statute does not
begin to run until discovery of fraud where the fraud is actively
concealed or is self-concealing in nature.7" This is in accord with
equitable principles long held applicable in construing other Federal
statutes of limitations. 1 The burden is upon the United States to
prove that (1) the fraud was concealed or self-concealing so as not
to fall within the statute of limitations, and (2) it remained so for
the appropriate period. 2 The United States must be specific in
pleading the manner in which the fraud was effected and the steps
taken to achieve secrecy.73 Possession of the means of obtaining
knowledge of the fraud is tantamount to knowledge itself,74 and
the United States may be precluded by laches from asserting that
the statute was tolled for the necessary period.75
In a number of cases courts have considered whether fraud
was concealed or self-concealing, and whether the United States
was guilty of laches in not discovering the fraud. The character
of land as mineral land can be considered concealed where the
proofs include applicant's affidavit that the land is not mineral
land.76 The most common type of fraud involved in this group of
cases is misrepresentation of ownership of the beneficial interest
in a claim under homestead laws or under coal land laws so as to
conceal the fact that the beneficial owner is not qualified to receive
See United States v. Winona & St. P. R.R., 165 U.S. 463 (1897). The statute
was not applicable in that case, so the language is dictum.
69 209 U.S. 447 (1908).
70 Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918).
71 Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342 (1875) (construing a statute of limitations section in
a bankruptcy act).
72
United States v. Bighorn Sheep Co., 9 F.2d 192 (D. Wyo. 1925).
73 United States v. Christopher, 71 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1934).
74 See United States v. Christopher, 71 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1934).
- United States v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 255 U.S. 323 (1921).
76
United States v. Southern Pac. R.R., 11 F.2d 546 (S.D. Cal. 1926).
68
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lands under those laws. 7 Unrecorded conveyances,78 and use of
nominees or trustees" have been found to be devices for actively
concealing true ownership. Denial of fraud in response to inquiries
also constitutes concealment."
The United States is not placed on inquiry of fraud through
knowledge that land was conveyed by the entryman within nine
months after patent,8 ' or through examination of books containing
disguised indications of fraud where the examination was conducted
for another purpose,82 and perhaps not through information appearing in county real estate records of which information the government had no actual knowledge.83 Knowledge that coal land was
occupied by a coal company disqualified to acquire the land at the
time the land was patented to an individual entryman probably
puts the United States on inquiry notice of fraud.84
No cases have been found suggesting that failure to discover
mistake or failure to discover lack of jurisdiction can be used as a
basis to toll the statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations is part of the public land laws and
is applicable only to public lands subject to acquisition under the
laws enacted for the disposition of the public domain.' It does not
apply to lands withdrawn from disposition under a swamp lands act
by treaty obligating the United States to apply the land and the
proceeds of its sale exclusively to the use, support and civilization
of certain Indians.88 It does not apply to lands as to which possessory
rights have been earlier acquired by individual Indians,87 to reserved
77 See United States v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 255 U.S. 323 (1921) ; cases cited
7

note 18 supra.
8 United States v. Booth-Kelly Lumber Co., 246 Fed. 970 (D. Ore. 1917).

79

United States v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 255 U.S. 323 (1921); Exploration Co.
v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918).
80
United States v. Booth-Kelly Lumber Co., 246 Fed. 970 (D. Ore. 1917).
81 United States v. Albright, 234 Fed. 202 (D. Mont. 1916). But see United States
v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 255 U.S. 323 (1921), involving a pattern of conveyances from entrymen to the corporation almost immediately following the initiation
of the right to purchase.
82
United States v. Booth-Kelly Lumber Co., 246 Fed. 970 (D. Ore. 1917).
83
See United States v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 255 U.S. 323 (1921) ; United States
v. Christopher, 72 F.2d 375 (10th Cir. 1934). In each of these cases the question
was posed by the court, but not decided.
8 See Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914).
85
United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926); LaRoque v. United States, 239
U.S. 62 (1915) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 227 U.S. 355 (1913) ; see
Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
8United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926).
87
Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
88
LaRoque v. United States, 239 U.S. 62 (1915) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
227 U.S. 355 (1913).
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Indian lands, 8 or to acquired lands as to which there was no legislation authorizing sale. "9
The statute of limitations has been found inapplicable in certain
other fact situations. It does not bar an action by the United States
to impose a constructive trust on property in aid of a prior decree,
operating on the equitable owners only, holding the United States
to be the rightful owner." It does not apply to actions brought by
the United States for the benefit of third parties." The statute does
not apply to bar an action by the United States to establish a breach
of a condition subsequent in a grant based on legislation which
made no provision for confirmatory patents." One case has held
the statute inapplicable to an action by the United States to have
the title holder declared to be a trustee ex maleficio for the benefit
of the United States.93 This accomplishes indirectly what the United
States could not do directly; it has never been followed on this point
and probably should be regarded as an anomaly.94
Where an individual claims rights in lands derived through
the United States and allegedly initiated subsequent to issuance of
a patent to another and which could be given effect only by cancellation of that patent, the bar of the statute of limitations can be
asserted successfully against the individual."
An important and interesting question which apparently has
never been decided, although it has been adverted to many times, is
whether the statute of limitations applies to titles derived under
certifications of lands to the states, pursuant to statute, rather than
under patents."
agUnited States v. Stewart, 121 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1941). The court found the case
"readily distinguishable" from United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,
209 U.S. 447 (1908).
It seems questionable whether the distinction between
acquired lands not authorized to be sold and reserved public domain should have
any relevance for the purpose of determining the applicability of the statute of
limitations.
90 Independent Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 640 (1927); United States
v. Carbon County Land Co., 46 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1931), affd, 284 U.S. 534
(1932).
91 Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923) (an action for the benefit of Indian
wards of the United States).
92
Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147 (1921).
93 United States v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 48 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1931).
94 The only case cited by the court to support this creation of a constructive trust is
United States v. New Orleans Pac. Ry., 248 U.S. 507 (1919), cited in the concurring
opinion. In that case, the beneficiaries of the trust were homestead claimants to
whom the United States owed a statutory duty to protect their rights. This case
falls within the exception noted at note 91 supra.
95 Hogan v. United States, 72 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 752

(1935).
96 Independent Coal & Coke Co. v. United States. 274 U.S. 640 (1927) ; Louisiana v.
Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908) ; United States v. Winona & St. P. R.R. Co., 165 U.S.
463 (1897). Dictum in the latter case indicates a view that the statute of limitations is applicable, but subsequent cases indicate that the question is an open one.
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In conformity with the principle that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by
any statute of limitations unless Congress has clearly manifested
its intention that it should be so bound, 43 U.S.C. § 1166 is not
or to an action to recover the value of property patented by mistake. 8
applicable to an action for damages for obtaining a patent by fraud, 7
III. Attacks by the United States on Oil Shale Patents:
A. History of Issuance of Patents Covering Oil Shale
Placer Mining Claims
Prior to the Mineral Leasing Act, 9 enacted on February 25,
1920, oil shale was a mineral subject to location under the mining
laws of the United States. Many placer mining claims based on
discovery of oil shale were located prior to that time."0 The Mineral
Leasing Act withdrew oil shale from the operation of the mining
laws and made it subject to disposition by leasing only. 01 That Act
did not impair the effectiveness of valid oil shale placer mining
claims existent on February 25, 1920, and thereafter maintained
in compliance with the laws under which initiated. 2
In Emil L. Krushnic,0 2 the Land Department held that failure
to perform annual assessment work on an oil shale placer mining
claim was a failure to maintain the claim in compliance with the
laws under which initiated and automatically subjected the claim
to cancellation by the government. The United States instituted
contests against many of these claims on that basis and obtained a
number of administrative rulings declaring specific oil shale placer
mining claims void for failure to perform annual assessment work.'"
The question was pursued to the Supreme Court of the United States,
where it was held that the United States could not challenge the
validity of oil shale placer mining claims on the basis of failure to
perform annual assessment work.' In that case the claimant had
resumed assessment work before the contest was instituted, and the
97 United States v. Whited & Wheless, 246 U.S. 552 (1918).

98 See ibid. Mistake is not considered specifically, but the reasoning applies equally
to cases involving mistake.
041 Stat. 437 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1964).
100 See Emil L. Krushnic (On Rehearing), 52 Interior Dec. 295, 298 (1928); vacated
53 Interior Dec. 45 (1930).
10141 Stat. 451 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1964).
102 Ibid.
103 52 Interior Dec. 282 (1927) ; rehearing denied, 52 Interior Dec. 295 (1928)
vacated, 53 Interior Dec. 45 (1930).
104 See Union Oil Co. of California, 71 Interior Dec. 169 (1964); see also Schmidt,
Status of Unpatented Claims, QUARTERLY OF THE COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES,
July 1964, p. 125.
105
Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
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decision left some doubt whether this fact was essential to the result.
The Land Department took the position that it was.. and continued
to contest and declare void oil shale placer mining claims upon
which annual assessment work had not been performed during some
period after enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act and had not been
resumed prior to initiation of the contest. About five years passed
before a challenge to the validity of this position of the Land Department reached the United States Supreme Court. That Court held,
in Ickes v. Virginia-ColoradoDevelopment Corp., ° that the Land
Department's position was incorrect and that the United States could
not challenge oil shale placer mining claims based on failure to
perform assessment work whether or not assessment work had been
resumed prior to the time of initiation of a contest.
As a result of the Supreme Court decisions in the Krushnic and
Virginia-Colorado cases and the Land Department contests which
preceded them, there were many oil shale placer mining claims with
respect to which administrative decisions had been entered holding
the claims invalid on grounds found in the Krushnic and VirginiaColorado cases to reflect an erroneous view of the law.
The Land Department then recalled and vacated the administrative decision involved in the Virginia-Colorado case." 8 Subsequently, United States patents have issued covering a number of
claims without any action to vacate the decisions of invalidity entered
in the earlier contest proceedings. 09 This procedure appears to have
reflected a view by the Land Department that Virginia-Colorado
rendered those contest proceedings of no effect 1. . even though only
two of the many contests were directly involved in that case.
On February 16 and 23, 1962, a number of mineral patent
applications were rejected by decisions of the Manager of the Colorado Land Office."1 These applications related to oil shale placer
mining claims in Garfield and Rio Blanco Counties, Colorado,
which had been declared invalid in contests instituted between 1930
recalled and vacated sub nom. The
Shale Oil Company, 55 Interior Dec. 287 (1935).
107 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
108
The Shale Oil Company, 55 Interior Dec. 287 (1935), recalling and vacating Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 53 Interior Dec. 666 (1932). The Shale Oil
Company, supra, held that all other department decisions in conflict with the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Virginia-Colorado case
were "overruled."
109 See Schmidt, Status of Unpatented Claims, supra note 104 at p. 126.
106 See Instructions, 53 Interior Dec. 131 (1930),

110

See Union Oil Co. of California, 71 Interior Dec. 169 (1964), at Appendices C-I
to C-6, inclusive; see also The Shale Oil Company, 55 Interior Dec. 287, 290
(,9 ).

111 E.g., Union Oil Co. of California, C-07667, Decision of Manager of Colorado Land

Office, Bureau of Land Management.
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and 1933 bascd on failure to perform annual assessment work."1
The Manager of the Colorado Land Office held the claims invalid,
not on the basis that the decisions in the earlier contest proceedings
were correct, but that, under principles of finality of administrative
action, estoppel by adjudication, and res judicata, they cannot now
be challenged. 1 3 This position was sustained by the Solicitor on
April 17, 1964, in Union Oil Co. of California,"4 subject to resolution of a question with respect to some of the claims as to whether
the claimants had been afforded proper notice in the original contest
proceedings."'
The following discussion of the validity of oil shale placer
mining claim patents considers the general principles relating to
attacks on patents and the special implications which the foregoing
historical background has for the conclusive effect of oil shale placer
mining claim patents.
B. Conclusiveness of Oil Shale Patents
In the absence of special circumstances which might exist in
particular cases, there seems to be no basis upon which it could be
maintained seriously that oil shale placer mining claim patents were
issued as a result of fraudulent inducements by the patentees. The
fact that a particular claim had been declared void in a pre-VirginiaColorado contest would appear on the government's own records.
Absent an affirmative representation by the applicant that no such
contest existed, there would be no basis to charge the patentee with
fraudulent concealment of such a contest. Prio:. to the 1962 decisions of the Colorado Land Office, the Department of the Interior
was issuing patents in which a history of such contests appeared," 6
so there is no reason to believe that an applicant for patent would
have attempted to conceal the existence and results of such a contest.
The evidence of discovery of oil shale would be fully set forth in the
patent application in the usual case, so an allegation of fraudulent
concealment of absence of discovery should not be supportable.
2

11 See Union Oil Co. of California, 71 Interior Dec. 169, 170 (1964).
113 E.g., Union Oil Co. of California, C-07667, Decision of Manager of Colorado Land

Office, Bureau of Land Management.
11471 Interior Dec. 169 (1964).
115 The Solicitor explained that the effect of the statement in The Shale Oil Company,

55 Interior Dec. 287 (1935) that departmental decisions inconsistent with the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States were "overruled" was to destroy
the value of these cases as precedent but not to vacate the decisions. It noted that
The Shale Oil Company decision specifically "recalled and vacated" the decisions
in the two cases directly involved in that proceeding. The Shale Oil Company
decision also states that the adverse proceedings and decision of the Commissioner
in that case "must be held as without authority of law and void."
116 See Schmidt, Status of Unpatented Claims, supra note 104 at p. 126.
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The Department of the Interior might assert that issuance of an
oil shale placer mining claim patent resulted from mistake, in a
situation where the claim's history includes a pre-Virginia-Colorado
contest resolved unfavorably to the claimant. The argument would
be that by mistake of law the Department of the Interior officials
considered themselves compelled by law to issue patents notwithstanding such contests, and that this mistake became apparent only
upon decision of Union Oil Company of California. There is
only technical merit in this argument. A counter-argument could
be made that until legal title passes from the United States, the
Department of Interior is free to reconsider and reopen any proceeding at any time,"' and that the issuance of a patent in these circumstances operated as a withdrawal of the determination in the earlier
contest. If an attack is based on mistake, bona fide purchase would
be a good defense."' If other elements of bona fide purchase are
present, the existence of the possibility that the legal arguments
which prevailed in Union Oil Co. of California might be made
would not impair the bona fide purchaser status of one who purchased prior to that decision."' This is true even if the purchaser
knew at the time of purchase that the Department of the Interior
contemplated attacks on patents on such basis."' Furthermore, some
of the arguments used by the Department of the Interior to support
its decision in Union Oil Co. of California could be used in defending against an attack based on mistake. 21
Lack of jurisdiction would seem to provide a stronger basis
for attacks by the Department of Interior on these oil shale placer
mining claim patents. The government's contention would be that
when a contest is decided adversely to a claimant, and the claimant
fails to appeal, the decision becomes final. The result is that the
claim at that point is no longer valid, the land becomes part of the
public domain and is subject to the congressional withdrawal of oil
shale as a locatable mineral as effected by the Mineral Leasing
117

118
119
120
121

See West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200 (1929); Gabbs Exploration Co. v.
Udall, 315 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963) ; see also
Union Oil Co. of California, 71 Interior Dec. 169, 181 (1964).
See cases cited at note 56 supra.
See United States v. Southern Pac. R.R., 184 U.S. 49 (1902).
See ibid.
Thus, it could be argued that the change in interpretation of the requirements of
the law since the patent should not be given retroactive effect. Union Oil Company
of California, 71 Interior Dec. 169, 175 (1964). Also, the issuance of a patent
being an adjudication of a special tribunal as to the validity of the claim, it could
be argued that it is res judicata on this issue, at least where the Department of the
Interior has acquiesced through failure to complain for a number of years. Id. at
p. 176.
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Act. 22 Therefore, the argument would proceed, the Department
of the Interior was without jurisdiction to issue the patent, and it is
void. The ability of the Department of the Interior to reconsider
past decisions is limited to situations where the Department retains
jurisdiction of the land." It has no such jurisdiction as to withdrawn land, at least for the purpose of disposing of the land under
the mining laws as land valuable for oil shale. Were this argument
to prevail, bona fide purchase should provide no defense. 2'
Absent a successful frontal attack on United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Power Company," section 1166 of 43 U.S.C. bars
the United States from recovery of lands patented more than
six years prior to attack where the attack is founded on mistake or
lack of jurisdiction. No authority has been discovered holding that
the statute can be tolled where these are the bases of attack. The
United States would have a compensation remedy in these cases,
but compensation should be based on the value of the land at the
date of the patent less the amount paid by the patentee. 2 Bona
fide purchase would insulate an owner from such remedy if the
claim is founded on mistake. 2 Although no authority has been
found, there is no reason to believe that bona fide purchase would
provide a defense where the claim is based on lack of jurisdiction.
Serious concern is justified that an oil shale placer mining claim
patent less than six years old, covering a claim held to be void in
a pre-Virginia-Coloradocontest, can be successfully attacked by the
United States. Patents older than six years should be successfully
insulated from attack by United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co. Present owners of properties covered by those patents
may be subject to a compensation claim by the United States without
122

2

1

124
125

126
227

A similar argument, based on Executive Order No. 5327, which withdrew for purposes of investigation, examination, and classification all oil shale deposits owned
by the United States, from lease or other disposal, subject to valid existing rights,
was made but not pursued to its logical conclusion in Union Oil Company of California, 71 Interior Dec. 169, 183 (1964).
See West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200 (1929).
See text following note 56 supra.
The possibility of such an attack cannot be discounted entirely. Cases which could
be regarded as making inroads in the philosophy, although not the holding, of the
case, include Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918) (holding that
concealed fraud tolls the statute of limitations); and United States v. Whited &
Wheless, 246 U.S. 552 (1918) (holding that the statute of limitations does not
apply to an action to recover damages for fraud).
As discussed above, the measure of damages has not received extensive consideration
in the reported cases.
The defense of bona fide purchase should apply in actions for compensation under
the same reasoning applicable in actions to recover lands. See cases cited at note 56
supra.
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regard to their status as bona fide purchasers. 1"8 In view of the
aggressive attitude which the Department of the Interior has exhibited toward oil shale placer mining claims in the past, there
is no reason to expect that attacks on oil shale patents will not be
initiated and vigorously prosecuted.
Final evaluation of the effect which Union Oil Co. of California
will have upon the conclusiveness of oil shale placer mining claim
patents must be reserved until it is seen how the rules of law stated
129
in that decision fare in the courts.
ATTACKS BY INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING

No

RIGHTS

IN THE PATENTED CLAIM

The United States mining laws prescribe a procedure which
must be followed by a claimant seeking to obtain a patent to a
mining claim. 3 ' This procedure includes the following steps: (1) a
copy of the notice of application for patent, and a copy of the
survey plat, if applicable,' must be posted in a conspicuous place
on the claim or claims covered by the application, (2) a copy of
the notice of application for patent must be filed in the Land Office
by the applicant and must be posted in the Land Office by the
register and (3) a notice that application for patent has been made
must be published by the register in a newspaper designated by the
register as being published nearest the claim. The statute and the
rules of the Department of the Interior' prescribe the length of
time during which such posting and publication shall continue.
Notice given pursuant to statute is essential to vest in the
Department of the Interior jurisdiction to issue the patent. 3' The
notice affords all persons having an adverse claim the opportunity
See Schmidt, Status of Unpatented Claims, supra note 104 at 127, where it is said:
It is our view as title examiners in the State of Colorado that we will
be forced to note on all title opinions concerning oil shale patents that, if
the Department of Interior's present decisions as outlined on February 16,
1962, and April 17, 1964, are allowed to stand, all the patents heretofore
issued with a history of such contests could be subject to suit by the Government to recover the land or the value thereof.
1' Discussion of the merits of the Union Oil Co. of California decision and the present
status of judicial actions which have been initiated to test the validity of the rules
of law stated therein are not within the scope of this article. The only reported
result to date is the denial of a motion by the United States to dismiss a complaint
raising these issues. Oil Shale Corporation v. Udall, 235 F. Supp. 606 (D. Colo.
1964).
13021 Stat. 61 (1880), 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
128

1

13 See 26 Stat. 1097 (1880),

30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
132 See 43 C.F.R. § 3453.1 (1965).
13 3.Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Conkling Mining Co., 255 U.S. 151 (1921)
El Paso Brick Co. v. McKnight, 233 U.S. 250 (1914).
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to be heard in opposition to the issuance of the patent.'
This
opportunity is not limited to claimants under the mining laws.'
It has been held that personal notice is not required to be given
to conflicting claimants even if the applicant knew or could have
determined from Land Office records the names and addresses of
the conflicting claimants. 3 ' Notice given by publication brings all
adverse claimants into the patent application proceedings. 7 It has
been stated that notice so given is due process of law. 3' Failure of
any claimant to file an adverse claim in the patent proceedings
precludes the adverse claimant from contesting the patent, regardless
of the substantive merit of his claim.'
No one can successfully attack a patent collaterally, 40 unless
that patent is void. 4 " Thus, it would seem that the only time a third
party can attack a patent when the Department of the Interior had
no jurisdiction to issue the patent, as where the lands never were the
property of the United States, no legislation authorized their sale, or
they had been previously disposed of or reserved from sale."4
In a limited area, however, a third party can maintain an
action to have the patentee declared to be a constructive trustee for
the benefit of the third party. This requires that the aggrieved
party possess such an equitable right to the premises as would give
him the title if the patent were out of the way,' or that through
the fraud of the patentee the aggrieved pary who had a superior
claim was kept in ignorance of the patent proceedings 44 or was
fraudulently induced not to file an adverse claim,' 4' in a situation
34

El Paso Brick Co. v. McKnight, 233 U.S. 250 (1914).
135 Northern Pac. R.R. v. Cannon, 54 Fed. 252 (9th Cir. 1893), appeal dismissed on
appellant's motion, 166 U.S. 17 Sup.Ct. 997 (1896) (memorandum decision).
136 Ibid.
1

Wight v. Dubois, 21 Fed. 693 (C.C.D. Colo. 1884) ; Kannaugh v. Quartette Mining
Co., 16 Colo. 341, 27 Pac. 245 (1891).
138 Golden Reward Min. Co. v. Buxton Min. Co., 79 Fed. 868 (C.C.D.S.D. 1897).
139 Golden Reward Min. Co. v. Buxton Min. Co., 79 Fed. 868 (C.C.D.S.D. 1897);
Wight v. Dubois, 21 Fed. 693 (C.C.D. Colo. 1884) ; Seymour v. Fisher, 16 Colo.
188, 27 Pac. 240 (1891) ; see Gwillim v. Donnellan, 115 U.S. 45 (1885).
140 Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 106 U.S. 447 (1882) ; Putnam v. Ickes, 78
F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 612 (1935).
141 See St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1882).
142 See ibid.
143 St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1882); see Leonard v.
Lennox, 181 Fed. 760 (8th Cir. 1910). This does not require that the claimant
establish that at the moment patent issued it should have been awarded to him.
It is enough if he has brought himself so far within the laws as to entitle him,
if not obstructed or prevented, to complete his claim. Duluth & Iron Range R.R. v.
Roy, 173 U.S. 587 (1899).
"44 Seymour v. Fisher, 16 Colo. 188, 27 Pac. 240 (1891).
"' See Golden Reward Min. Co. v. Buxton Min. Co., 79 Fed. 868 (D. S.D. 1897).
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where such party had a prior right.'' Laches is a defense to claims
of this nature."' State statutes of limitations may also provide
defenses in appropriate cases.'"
Placer mining patents must yield to extralateral rights of lode
claims, and any question concerning such rights is not concluded by
a patent but must be resolved by the courts."
ATTACKS BY INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING A PRE-PATENT
INTEREST IN THE PATENTED CLAIM

If a patent issues to fewer than all the owners of a mining
claim, the patentee will be considered to hold title as trustee for the
owners not named in the patent to the extent of their respective
interests.'" These latter persons can maintain an equitable action to
enforce the trust."'
The same reasoning should ,result in a conclusion that easements, liens, and other interests in an unpatented mining claim, in
appropriate proceedings, should be assertable as interests in legal
title to the claim on issuance of patent. No cases considering this
situation have been discovered.
Statutes of limitations requiring adverse possession or exclusive
possession for creation of limitation title are of little value in defending against an alleged co-owner in Colorado, for the possession
of one co-tenant is, under usual conditions, considered not to be
adverse to other co-tenants.'
Until actual ouster of a co-tenant has
been established by conduct apart from mere use and occupation
of the land, the statute based upon a claim of adverse possession
does not run.'
In proceedings involving Colorado lands, Colorado Revised
4

See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) for a discussion of the types
of fraud which will permit re-examination of a decree of court; see also Vance v.
Burbank, 101 U.S. 519 (1880).
47 United States v. Marshall Silver Mining Co., 129 U.S. 579 (1888).
148 See e.g. (in the case of Colorado lands) COLO. REV. STAT., §§ 87-1-15; 118-7-8, -9,
-11 (1963).
149 Round Mountain Mining Co. v. Round Mountain Sphinx Mining Co., 36 Nev. 543,
138 Pac. 71 (1914); see Empire State-Idaho Mining & Dev. Co. v. Bunker Hill &
Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 114 Fed. 420 (9th Cir. 1902), cert. denied,
186 U.S. 482 (1902).
' 5 0 Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U.S. 578 (1893) ; Ballard v. Golob, 34 Colo. 417, 83 Pac.
376 (1905).
151 Ibid. These constructive trust proceedings are not technically attacks on validity of
the patent; the effect of the patent to pass title from the United States is not challenged in these cases.
152 F.
v. Davi.do, 137 Colo. 48,22P.,1
.n
976 (1958) ; Rose v. Ruso, 119 Colo.
473, 204 P.2d 1075 (1949).
153 Fallon v. Davidson, 137 Colo. 48, 320 P.2d 976 (1958).
'1
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Statutes 87-1-15 (1963)is, offers the best promise for a defense based
upon a statute of limitations. To start this statute running, it is
necessary that the trust be repudiated and the fact of that repudiation
be made known to the beneficiary.'55 A conveyance by the trustee
probably would effect repudiation of the trust. 5 '
Recordation of the conveyance probably would not assure constructive notice to the beneficiary, for the constructive notice effect
probably would be limited to persons acquiring interests after recordation of the conveyance."5 The burden of proving that the cause of
action accrued within less than five years before the suit was begun
is upon the person denying the applicability of the statute.158
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN EXAMINING TITLE TO
PROPERTIES TITLE TO WHICH Is DERIVED UNDER

OIL SHALE PLACER MINING CLAIM PATENTS
In any transaction for the sale or encumbrance of patented oil
shale placer mining claims where the values involved justify maximum care and caution, the scope of the customary examination of
title to patented lands can be expanded to obtain additional information which will be helpful in evaluating the possibility that the
patents could be challenged successfully.
Of course, no examination of official records could be expected
to disclose actual fraud. The authorities with respect to bona fide
purchase provide the only effective insulation from this infirmity.
I. Abstracts of Title:
A complette abstract of title should be examined rather than
an abstract limited to that period of time beginning with the issuance
of the patent. (This is not to suggest that such a limitation is ever
advisable.) This will disclose any recorded claims of co-owners or
of holders of other interests in the patented claim which were not
recognized in issuance of the patent. Under the Colorado recording
act"' subsequent purchasers undoubtedly are on constructive notice
of such recorded interests.
It is suggested that photographic abstracts be obtained, or that
15 4

provides:
In certain trusts, five years limitation. - Bills of relief, in case of
the existence of a trust not cognizable by the courts of common law, and in
all other cases not provided for in this article, shall be filed within five
years after the cause thereof shall accrue, and not thereafter.
1 5
5 Ballard v. Golob, 34 Colo. 417, 83 Pac. 376 (1905).
15 6
Vanderwiele v. Vanderwiele, 110 Colo. 556, 136 P.2d 523 (1943) ; see Ballard v.
Golob, note 155 supra.
57
' The Colorado recording act is found at COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-6-9 (1963).
8
15 Cliff v. Cliff, 23 Colo. App. 183, 128 Pac. 860 (1912).
159

COLO. REV. STAT. § 87-1-15 (1963)

COLO. REV. STAT. 118-6-9 (1963).
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the examination of non-photographic abstracts be supplemented by
a comparison with the original county records, to minimize the
possibilities for error.
II. Status Reports:
Status reports based upon the Bureau of Land Management
records in the applicable state office of the Bureau of Land Management and upon the Bureau of Land Management records in Washington, D. C., can be obtained. These reports can be prepared on the
basis of personal examination of the records, but, in the case of the
Washington, D. C., records, it is usually more convenient to cause
them to be prepared by attorneys in that city.
Such reports would reveal whether the lands were subject to
disposition by the United States at the relevant times and whether
any adverse claims under the mining laws or other laws had been
perfected in the Bureau of Land Management prior to issuance of
the mining claim patent. They would also help reveal whether any
contests had been conducted against the claim being examined prior
to issuance of the patent, as discussed in more detail below.
Perhaps this step could be omitted without significant practical
risk, in reliance on the usual check made by the Bureau of Land
Management prior to patent.
III. Patent Application Files:
The files covering the patent applications can be examined to
assure that no jurisdictional step was omitted. This is particularly
important if the abstract discloses conflicting mining claims located
prior to patent or if there are indications, in the status reports or
elsewhere, of other conflicting claims of any kind. The notice and
publication procedures prescribed by statute are jurisdictional and
must have been followed to assure that such conflicting interests
have been effectively extinguished. In many cases the patent application file will be in the National Archives in Washington, D. C., or
in the Bureau of Land Management records in or near that city. In
such cases the only feasible approach may be to cause the files to be
examined by Washington, D. C., attorneys. Specific instructions
concerning the matters to be checked should be provided to them.
Perhaps no significant practical risk would be involved in omitting this examination, for Bureau of Land Management officers
would not knowingly have issued a patent if the essential preliminary steps had not been taken.

iV. Contests:
It is essential to determine to the extent possible whether the
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claim on which the patent is based was previously held invalid in a
contest based on failure to perform annual assessment work. This
will determine whether there is danger that the patent can be attacked by the United States and whether the present owner may be
subject to a claim by the United States for compensation. There is
no easy way to ferret out these contests. Reference to contests found
in the tract books and plat books in Denver and tract books in
Washington, D. C., cannot be relied upon as complete. An unofficial tract book is maintained in Washington, D. C., relating solely
to oil shale placer mining claims and sets forth references to contests
and to patents issued in connection with oil shale placer mining
claims. A large contest docket and a card file are maintained by the
Bureau of Land Management in Denver. The latter probably is not
complete. The former should be reliable and should disclose any
such contest, but the contests are listed serially by contest numbers,
with no index by claim name or legal description. Thus, examination of these books is an extensive and time-consuming task. If there
is an easy way to determine whether a claim has ever been contested
the author has not discovered it.
Once a contest is discovered, the file relating to the contest
should be examined, if possible, to ascertain the outcome and, if
adverse to the claimant, whether proper notice was given to interested parties.
V. State Records:
As an extra precaution, the records in the office of the State
Board of Land Commissioners of the State of Colorado can be
checked to assure that no claim to the lands is asserted by or under
the State. Any such claim should be revealed by the federal records,
but this additional check can be made quickly and provides further
assurance that no such claim exists.
VI. Miscellaneous:
In addition to checking the above matters, which have particular
relevance to the question of the conclusiveness of patents, other usual
steps in title examination should be followed, such as surface inspection; geological inspection for known lodes; examination of the
patent to ascertain the nature of reservations contained therein;
examination of a certificate of taxes due; examination of a plat of
a boundary survey; and examination of plats and field notes of the
government surveys, to the extent this latter step is necessary to
solve any special problems which may exist.
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CONCLUSION

Although the title problems of owners of patented oil shale
mining claims are not great in comparison with the problems of the
owners of unpatented oil shale claims and in comparison with the
problems involved in evolving a policy for development of federallyowned oil shale lands, they are nonetheless real. The fate of Union
Oil Co. of California in the courts, and clarification of the policy
which the Department of the Interior will adopt toward patented
oil shale claims must be awaited before the questions concerning
the conclusiveness of patented oil shale placer mining claims can be
answered with confidence.

